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Introduction
The war in Afghanistan recently passed the ten-year milestone with much more work still ahead.
Over the years as the insurgency began to flourish, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the U.S. Government (USG) adopted a comprehensive campaign to counteract the insurgent's influence on the population. This campaign plan includes three lines of effort; Security, Governance and Reconstruction and Development.
1 As the major contributing nation to NATO and ISAF, The United
States has formulated a detailed strategy to align with these three lines of effort contributing billions of dollars along the way. The USG's aims within the Governance and Reconstruction and Development lines of effort are to develop the local economies and foster a free and democratic form of government.
There are many initiatives, which fit into these lines of effort. For example, Agricultural Development
Teams (ADTs) introduce new farming techniques and alternative crops to Afghan farmers in an effort to increase productivity, income and reduce poppy cultivation. The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) provides money to operational commanders for development projects in their operational areas, which enables local governance. The USG has organized and fielded Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to foster good governance and help develop infrastructure. In spite of all this effort, some evidence suggests that the Afghan people are not using these programs and the facilities and infrastructure they create. 2 This is puzzling to many westerners who do not understand why Afghans reject these ideas and programs that seem to have obvious benefits. If Afghans do not adopt these programs, then the USG's efforts are fruitless. Thus, the USG would benefit greatly from an analysis as to how it can adjust or tailor its programs to encourage increased adoption.
Fortunately, a large body of academic work exists that examines this very phenomenon, the diffusion of innovations. Diffusion research, first presented in 1962 by Everett M. Rogers in his book by the same title, provides a solid and generally accepted framework for understanding how innovations (ideas and technology) diffuse across (or are adopted by) a social system. 3 Rogers posits that the attributes of an innovation as perceived by the social system are key indicators of its rate of adoption.
These attributes include; the relative advantage of the innovation, the compatibility of the innovation with the social system (culture), the complexity of the innovation, the ability to use the innovation on a trial basis (trialability) and the ability of the people to see the positive results of an innovation (observability). This work applies the diffusion of innovations theory and model in the analysis of the USG's governance and development efforts in Afghanistan to determine if the key elements of diffusion of innovations are present. Furthermore, this monograph seeks to determine if these elements, when present, correlate with the Afghans' increased adoption of the programs. Where the elements of diffusion of innovations are found in USG governance and development efforts, those efforts should be more successful. While many nations contribute to the ISAF mission along these two crucial lines of effort, this work will focus on only the USG's programs in order to limit the analysis to a manageable level.
However, the author contends that if the research were expanded and similar analysis conducted on any governance or development endeavor in Afghanistan the same correlations would be found.
This work will first examine the literature concerning diffusion of innovations. The rest of the monograph is organized utilizing three of the four elements of diffusion of innovations; social system, communication channel and the innovation. Then the work examines development and governance initiatives using five attributes of an innovation if they apply.
Diffusion of Innovations: A Review of the Literature
If we acknowledge that the governance and development lines of effort involve ideas that the USG is trying to persuade Afghans to adopt, then an application of knowledge obtained through diffusion research would be helpful in analyzing these programs to determine how the USG can improve and accelerate the adoption process. Therefore, an understanding of the theory of diffusion of innovations is necessary.
Although scholars may not have called it diffusion of innovations, many had been doing diffusion-based research for a considerable time before Rogers' 1962 This enables the communication researcher to focus on the process of diffusion.
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With the evolution of diffusion research explained, next it is important to understand and define the theory. Rogers defines diffusion as "the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system." 12 He defines innovation as "an idea, Rogers and Shoemaker, [66] [67] Ibid., 5.
13 Rogers, 12. 14 Ibid., 13. Rogers did not specifically mention diffusion from one social system to another in his definition, he clearly believes it is an integral part of diffusion research and his characteristics apply to this kind of diffusion as well.
With diffusion of innovations fully defined, next it is important to understand the major elements of the concept. Rogers identifies four main elements of diffusion of innovations. These elements are the social system in which the diffusion takes place, the communication channel, the innovation itself, and time. 21 These elements are important because are the key variables, which affect the rate of adoption of the innovation. In most applications of the diffusion model, organizations want to isolate and decrease the time variable. Time is the variable most organizations want to affect and therefore, addressed first.
If an organization or business is trying to promote a certain idea, they want it to diffuse across the target audience as quickly as possible. Therefore, time is the variable the organization tries to decrease through the manipulation of aspects of the other three. Likewise, in an analysis of governance and development efforts in Afghanistan, the key desire is for the Afghan people to adopt USG programs as quickly as possible. Rogers states this case well in the introduction of his book when he writes:
Getting a new idea adopted, even when it has obvious advantages, is difficult. Many innovations require a lengthy period of many years from the time when they become available to the time when they are widely adopted. Therefore, a common problem for many individuals and organizations is how to speed up the rate of diffusion of an innovation.
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Some organizations attempt to manipulate the perceived characteristics of an innovation in an effort to speed up its rate of adoption. Diffusion scholars have long examined how the perceived characteristics of the innovation itself affect the rate of adoption. To aid in this analysis, Rogers identifies five perceived attributes; relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability and observability.
20 Rogers, 376. 21 Ibid., 11.
22 Ibid., 1.
Relative advantage is the degree to which potential adopters perceive an innovation as better than the idea it supersedes. The greater degree potential adopters perceive innovations as advantageous in a social system, the quicker it will diffuse. Rogers defines compatibility as the degree to which potential adopters perceive an innovation is consistent with existing values, past experiences and needs. 23 In other words, the degree to which an innovation is compatible with the culture or the social system is a critical determinant in its rate of diffusion. Complexity deals with the potential adopter's perceptions about how difficult the innovation is to understand and use. The more complex a person perceives an innovation to be, the slower it will diffuse. Trialability deals with the ability of potential adopters to test the innovation without converting completely. If potential adopters can try the innovation before making a complete transition, they are more likely to adopt the innovation and it will diffuse more quickly across the social system. Finally, Rogers defines observability as the degree to which the results of an innovation are visible to others. 24 Obviously, for the innovation to diffuse successfully, a potential adopter must perceive those observations as advantageous.
The attributes of an innovation are useful as an analytical tool. An individual or organization wishing to diffuse an innovation can analyze the innovation's attributes with relation to the social system in order to determine its efficacy to individuals in the system. If certain aspects of the innovation do not seem to meet the positive criteria of the perceived attributes, the organization can tailor its messages to the target audience. For example, the organization can utilize messages that highlight the advantages of the innovation or make the innovation seem more compatible to the social system. The organization could present information to individuals demonstrating the use of the innovation hence reducing its complexity.
Perhaps the organization can determine a way to make the innovation "tryable" for the target social system. Finally, determining a way to make the innovation and its advantages observable to as many people as possible across the social system can greatly help the diffusion process. However, the infrastructure of the country and the culture has a great deal of influence on the effectiveness of the communication channel. If the population does not trust a mass media channel or the channel does not reach large portions of the population due to a lack of infrastructure or an austere environment, it will be less effective or worse, ineffective.
A critical lesson learned through diffusion research is that most people depend on another similar person's subjective evaluation of an innovation. 27 In other words, when an individual receives positive information about an innovation from a person who is similar to them and has already tried the innovation, the individual is more likely to adopt the innovation. Therefore, the more similar the adopter is to the person with whom he is communicating about an innovation, the more likely the other person 25 Brown, 6.
26 Rogers, 18. 27 Ibid., [18] [19] will adopt the innovation. The fourth element of diffusion is the social system. Rogers defines a social system as "a set of interrelated units (individuals) that are engaged in joint problem solving to accomplish a common goal."
31
For the purposes of this study, the social system is Afghanistan as a whole. While many sub cultures exist in the tribal and clan composition of the Afghan nation and culture, it is well beyond the scope of this work to delve into every aspect of these sub cultures and how they interact. A work of such magnitude would take several volumes and years of dedicated research. However, the social system is critically important. It affects perceptions and attitudes about innovations and therefore can be a strong determining factor in rates of adoption.
28 Robert Cialdini, Influence: Science and Practice (Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2001) 150-151. Cialdini cites one study conducted by Evans in 1963 where people were more likely to buy insurance from an agent who was similar in age, religion, politics and smoking habits. Cialdini also notes that the influence of similarity is so strong that many sales training programs urge trainees to "mirror and match" body posture, mood and verbal style of customers. 29 Rogers, 19. 30 Ibid., 27. 31 Ibid., 23.
The Afghan Social System
While it is well beyond the scope of the work to delve into every nuance of Afghan and Islamic culture, a basic understanding of the complex social system in which the USG operates is essential to understanding why Afghans fail to adopt USG initiatives. As Westerners, we can only hope to have a basic understanding of the Afghan culture. The nuances and latent features of the culture are too complex for an outsider to understand fully. Afghan culture is a unique mix of ethnic, tribal and religious variables.
The first, and perhaps most important, characteristic of Afghan culture is the strong tie Afghans have to their family, tribe and clan. These relationships typically form the strongest bonds in Afghan culture and are stronger than the concepts of nation or province. There are a vast number of ethnic groups resident in the country. This means the population's allegiances vary from region to region and tribe to tribe. Few Afghans automatically feel any allegiance to a larger national government or concept of nation unless the national power is from their ethnic group or tribe. This is evident in the way Afghans vote in elections. In a recent report to Congress, Kenneth Katzman illustrates this point when he states, "in spite of Afghanistan's post-Taliban political and economic modernization, patterns of political affiliation along family, clan, tribe, ethnicity, and region remain."
32 Additionally, he notes that these patterns are even more evident in provincial elections.
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Many ethnic groups have their own languages and dialects further hampering national unity and many ethnic groups are sub-divided into several tribes. It is difficult to put an exact number on the ethnic and tribal permutations that exist in Afghanistan. Adding another layer of confusion to this already complex cultural stew are the different sects of Islam, which include Sunni, Shia, Ismailis and Sufis. To a certain extent, these sects align with particular ethnic groups and tribes (See Table 1) . 35 Other religious groups are present, including Sikhs, Hindus and
Christians, but they exert little to no influence in the country. traditions. Secondly, the central government has never been able to exert much influence over the 80 percent of the rural population.
52 Finally, generally, the population is opposed to very radical liberal changes, and is rife with the ingredients that promote corruption.
A key asset in helping USG officials understand the social system is the HTTs demonstrate that the USG realizes the importance of the social system and its effect on the Afghan people's adoption of governance and development innovations it is trying to diffuse across Afghanistan. HTTs are a promising step in the right direction and address one of Rogers' key components of diffusion of innovations.
Afghan Communication Channels
How information concerning an innovation flows across the social system can greatly affect its rate of adoption. Sometimes the difference between adoption and rejection of an innovation is simply the 52 Katzman, Afghanistan: Politics Elections and Government Performance, 2. The most important communication channel (medium) in Afghanistan is radio. Radio is the most accessible media for Afghan households with eighty-two percent of respondents to the Afghanistan Survey 2010 saying they own a functioning radio. There is little difference in radio ownership between urban and rural areas.
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However, while radio may reach the most people, the most persuasive form of communication is word of mouth. Word of mouth, therefore, is the second most critical communication channel (medium).
Around one in five respondents (nineteen percent) to the Afghanistan Survey 2010 depend on friends and family to receive news and information. 55 The survey goes on to say, The use of oral communication to get news and information is high, with more than half of respondents using meetings in the community and sermons in mosques for this purpose, showing that traditional means of information dissemination continue to remain important in Afghan society. Respondents continue to prefer to get information on local news and events from personal acquaintances rather than leadership figures within their community.
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While radio reaches the most people and therefore is the best quantitative medium, word of mouth is the most effective means of persuasion or the best qualitative medium. Therefore, any comprehensive information campaign in Afghanistan must saturate both these communication channels. The challenge to USG officials with regard to the latter, word of mouth communication is that in order for it to be effective, it must originate from a personal acquaintance. In his discussion of change agents, Rogers talks about the problem of perceived heterophily (difference) between the target population and the change agent. He suggests that change agents can accelerate the diffusion process by employing opinion leaders within the social system to advocate the innovations. 57 The change agent in this case is the USG. The USG does not have much, if any, homophily (similarity) with the target population. Rogers identifies this as a substantial obstacle to adoption.
Therefore, enlisting opinion leaders in the Afghan community can greatly improve the chances of Afghans adopting and using development and governance initiatives. As stated earlier in the section on Afghan culture, some of these important opinion leaders would include religious imams and tribal elders.
Enlisting these kinds of people to champion USG development and governance initiatives can put an
Afghan face on the programs and increase the likelihood of Afghans adopting these innovations.
Development Initiatives
Some of the most important development initiatives currently underway in Afghanistan are in the Tariq et al., 219 . In the Afghanistan Survey 2010, thirty-four percent of respondents identified their occupation as "farmer" while another thirteen percent identified as "farm laborer." These figures do not account for the many other jobs and industries that support agriculture or rely on agriculture to support their industries. When these are considered, it can be assumed that well over half the population significantly relies on agriculture for their livelihood. 63 Sherman, 5. 64 Turner, 1. better farming practices during non-growing seasons, animal husbandry, bee keeping, and livestock production.
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By far the greatest obstacle the ADTs face is the illegal cultivation of opium poppy. This presents a significant problem for both the Afghan Government and coalition forces. 66 Additionally, as former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, has noted the poppy trade fuels the insurgency as insurgents purchase, funnel and sell poppy for profit 67 . Poppy farmers do not necessarily ally with insurgents for ideological reasons, but primarily for economic reasons. The widespread and virtually unimpeded growth of poppy delegitimizes the Afghan government since poppy cultivation is illegal.
Therefore, a major goal of the ADTs is to introduce legal commercial crops to replace the opium poppy.
This represents a shift from the previous hard-line approach taken in the middle of the decade when the Afghan Government implemented widespread eradication measures. These tactics risked pushing poppy farmers' loyalties towards the insurgents. Therefore, in recent years, efforts to introduce alternative crops have emerged as a possible viable alternative and the ADT is a key element in the implementation of these efforts. Some of the potential substitute crops include wheat, grapes, pomegranates, almonds, and dates.
68

Analysis of Development Initiatives
Afghans are not adopting the development programs the USG is promoting because these programs fail to conform to the primary elements of diffusion of innovations, including the communication channel and perceived attributes of an innovation. Among the three reasons Ms. Sherman cites for why Afghans are indifferent about USG development projects, is that some Afghans apparently 65 Perceptions of compatibility and complexity are closely related. Afghans may perceive some innovations as complex because the change agent (the USG) does not know how to communicate information about the program to the Afghan people. If the USG employs opinion leaders immersed in the culture to champion programs, there is the added benefit that these opinion leaders can devise ways to simplify the innovations and make them easier to use reducing their complexity. Making the innovations less complex to the Afghan people could encourage more adoption.
Another retardant to the Afghan's adoption of USG development initiatives is the fact that many programs do not offer much trialability. For instance, Ms. Sherman's second cited reason for Afghans not using USG projects and services is that some segments of the population do not support the Taliban, but the projects are in Taliban controlled regions and therefore the population is afraid to use or maintain the services. 77 If Afghans fear for their lives or the lives of their families if they adopt an innovation, adoption of that innovation will be severely limited. Therefore, the security situation has a profound effect on the perceived trialability of USG programs.
76 Sherman, 5. 77 Ibid.
Alternative crop programs do not offer much trialability to the Afghan farmer either.
Additionally, it is hard for Afghan farmers to dedicate a portion of their fields to growing grapes, almonds and pomegranates, which may take several years to produce significant yields, and hence profits. Every acre that Afghan farmers dedicate to these alternative crops reduces his potential profits and money in his pocket.
Finally, observability is a difficult attribute to demonstrate to Afghan farmers. It takes at least a growing season, and in many cases several growing seasons for them to see the advantages of alternative crops. Afghan farmers have to take considerable risk when devoting a portion of their arable land to a new crop with no guarantees of comparable profits. Therefore, Afghan farmers do not adopt alternative crops quickly because it is hard for them to observe their advantages quickly.
Governance Initiatives
Governance is the USG's second critical line of effort. Some strategists believe that the quality and extent of Afghan Governance is the most crucial variable. Afghans report that between a third and a half of contacts with core government institutions involve some level of corruption. 97 Additionally, fifty-two percent of Afghans fear encounters with the ANP with nineteen percent responding they would have a lot of fear this is probably mainly due to corruption. More than half of the respondents who had contact with ANP officers in the last year report having encountered some level of corruption in the form of payment. 98 On one hand, as mentioned earlier, the Afghan people's perception of the ANP is high, but, on the other hand, they still see them as corrupt. Until corruption is not a significant issue, democracy in Afghanistan will continue to be a fleeting prospect.
Unfortunately, the USG can do little to change this problem and may possibly be making it worse. The billions of dollars the USG provides to Afghanistan for development and governance may be priming the corruption pumps.
94 Katzman, Afghanistan: Post Taliban Governance, Security and U.S. Policy, 12. 95 Ibid.
96 Tariq et al., 5. 97 Ibid., 7.
98 Ibid., 37.
The security situation is another key factor that greatly affects the development of a central democratic government. Perhaps the most troubling assessment from the Afghanistan Survey 2010 is that levels of fear to participate are on the rise. 99 The essence of democratic governance rests in the participation of the people, both in their voting and running for office. Unfortunately, the security situation dissuades many Afghans from participating. In the Afghanistan Survey 2010 only thirty-nine percent of respondents said they would have no fear participating in National elections and only twentyeight percent said they would have no fear running for office.
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Analysis of Governance Initiatives
Unlike 99 Tariq et al., 37. 100 Ibid.
USG Governance efforts also demonstrate the first perceived attribute of innovation, relative advantage. For instance, the principle of ownership encourages the consultation of the host nation officials when determining development projects and needs. This ensures that projects meet real needs in the population. As the government meets the critical needs of the people in the community, the Afghan people's confidence in their government will grow. As their confidence grows, they will perceive their new government as a relative advantage over the old system. The attribute of complexity is illustrated through the USAID principle of assessment as it requires agencies to assess local conditions, adapt best practices and design projects to fit local conditions. 102 This ensures that projects and information about them is tailored to the local people to make them easily implementable and understandable.
101 FM 3-07, C-4. 102 Ibid.
Trialability represents another challenge to USG governance efforts. The prevalence of corruption throughout the government limits the trust and confidence ordinary Afghans have in their government making it less likely that they will participate (trialability). The poor security situation deters many Afghans from participating in the government, both through voting in elections and running for office. 103 Finally, as long as the Afghan people perceive the ANP as corrupt and fear them the ability to test (trialability) the innovation of a strong democratic central government will be difficult.
Demonstrating the attribute of observability also remains a challenge. As mentioned earlier, the rural and tribal nature of Afghan culture and geography limit the central government's effect on common
Afghans making it difficult to observe the new governmental system. This trend has not changed since ISAF arrived. Prior to 2009, the central government controlled a mere thirty percent of the country.
Insurgents controlled approximately four percent. Tribes and local groups with varying degrees of loyalty to the central government controlled the remainder of the country; almost seventy percent. 104 The recent shift of focus to local governance is a promising development because it makes governance more observable to the ordinary Afghan.
The analysis presented above shows a mix of results. In many cases, Afghans have confidence in the democratic process and national government. However, the system continues to be plagued by corruption. The verdict remains out on whether Afghans will fully embrace a strong central democratic form of government. In the meantime, U.S. officials are taking many steps in the right direction.
Implications for the Operational Artist
Operational planners and Commanders can benefit from the analysis above and the application of diffusion research. This study demonstrates that in Afghanistan, and other operational theaters requiring full spectrum operations, diffusion research can be very helpful in the design of lines of effort. It can be particularly helpful in the governance, and development and reconstruction arenas. Additionally, diffusion 103 Terrain Teams, ADT and PRT personnel to determine program goals, understand culture and media preferences and then tailor information messages and messengers to persuade the populace to adopt these programs. Planning must include ways to use opinion leaders within the populace who are most like the population to champion the innovations further increasing the potential for adoption.
Planners must understand the benefits of the innovations from the population's point of view, leverage these benefits and in some cases, when possible, adapt the innovation to accommodate greater benefits. Planners must not assume because they see the obvious advantages of an innovation that the target population will too. Rogers specifically cautions against this tendency. He calls it the pro innovation bias. 105 Campaign plans which identify governance and development programs that have considerable relative advantages to the people and tailor messages about programs to highlight those advantages will generate more rapid adoption and diffusion throughout the populace.
One of the most important things planners must do when implementing governance and development plans is to understand the context or the social system in which they are operate. Once planners understand the social system they can assess if the programs they wish to implement are compatible with the culture. Webber stresses the importance of this approach when he highlights L.A.
Brown's statement "suppliers of innovations have a role to play in encouraging their adoption -by adapting the innovation to the people's taste and pockets; by establishing agencies through which the innovation is distributed to the population and by encouraging its use."
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Making initiatives seem less complex is closely related to compatibility and the communication channel. If planners tailor messages to fit into the culture and utilize indigenous opinion leaders to communicate information about the innovations, they will seem less complex. There is less chance for misunderstandings, no need to translate information about the innovation. The opinion leader can place information about the innovation in the proper cultural context making it easier for people to understand and therefore increasing potential for adoption.
Planners should focus development efforts on initiatives which can be easily sampled by the local populace without a full commitment. The greater the risk to the individual, the less tryable the innovation is. If planners can implement programs on a trial basis to allow the population to experiment with the innovation and test it to experience its benefits first hand, adoption should increase. The analysis of alternative crop initiatives demonstrates these initiatives are not easily tryable. A possible technique to promote increased and more rapid adoption might be using the same method the insurgents use to encourage poppy cultivation. The USG could front the farmer the money and supplies to get the desired product started therefore reducing the risk and demonstrating greater trialability. Perhaps the most significant obstacle to any perceptions of trialability is the security situation. As long as people fear attacks from insurgents for trying new USG and Host Nation government sponsored programs, they will be less likely to adopt these innovations. Therefore, security must come first.
Making governance and development initiatives more observable to the populace requires a host nation face on everything. Host nation officials promoting development projects allow the population to 106 Webber, 487. observe their government in action. Locals observing host nation army and police actively patrolling and effectively protecting the population builds their trust and confidence and demonstrates the advantage of new systems and institutions. Operational commanders demonstrate this through partnered patrols with host nation forces in the lead. However, for these observations to lead to increased adoption, they must demonstrate positive results. Corruption could be the biggest obstacle to this. Observances of bad governance and corruption can have the exact opposite effect. Operational commanders must promote through mentorship professional, ethical host nation armed forces.
This is not to say that the USG in Afghanistan is not already employing many of the suggestions mentioned above. In fact, the USG has come a considerably long way in the right direction with regard to these needs. The HTT, PRT and ADT are all examples of organizations that did not exist in 2002 when the United States initially invaded Afghanistan. These organizations were born out of an identified need.
While the leaders who instituted these organizations may not have read Rogers, or knew of diffusion of innovations, it is apparent that they recognized many of the same social phenomena at work in Afghanistan that diffusion researchers have identified and examined over the years. Therefore is it most important that the USG not lose the institutional knowledge it has gained over the last ten years of war.
Conclusion
This study demonstrates that many of these lessons conform to the elements of diffusion of innovations. The USG has developed HTTs to understand the culture in which it operates recognizing the importance of the social system's effects on the adoption of new ideas. While the HTTs are indispensable in helping operational commanders understand the culture and tailor programs for success, the USG must understand that the Afghan culture presents many obstacles to complete adoption of many desired programs and the potential for the Afghan people to reinvent innovations in undesirable ways is great.
The development of the ADT to diffuse new agricultural innovations and techniques to the Afghan people is generally a positive trend. Aspects of the ADT's practices include designing agricultural development programs which best achieve the needs of the people. However, the ADTs and alternative agricultural development programs in Afghanistan face an uphill battle against the vastly more lucrative poppy trade.
This study demonstrates that diffusion of innovations offers a particularly useful lens for understanding why Afghans are not adopting many of these agricultural development programs. Specifically because they do not demonstrate a relative advantage over poppy cultivation and it is hard for Afghans to try the new crops without losing considerable profits. Finally, the USG's fielding of PRTs has improved governance initiatives in the country. The PRTs consult local government officials ensuring governance has a constant Afghan face demonstrating Rogers' recommendation to enlist opinion leaders to help with the diffusion process and increase adoption potential. The PRT's consultation with local officials also ensures development programs meet the needs of the people demonstrating the new form of governance presents a relative advantage over the old form and is observable to the Afghan people. The PRTs and
Brigades utilize radio to disseminate information about development initiatives because they understand that radio is one of the most important communication channels in Afghanistan.
This study demonstrates the power that diffusion of innovations can have in the examination of governance and development efforts in stability and support operations but more research is required to strengthen this line of thought. A comprehensive research agenda is required to learn the most we can about effective governance and development initiatives. 107 Future research should focus on specific programs designed with diffusion of innovations concepts in mind. Such research could utilize a quasiexperimental design where two groups are tested using different variables of diffusion research. A research study such as this could definitively prove the merits of diffusion of innovations ideas in USG stability and support operations. Once researchers can further demonstrate the efficacy of applying diffusion of innovations theory to USG governance and development efforts, then those tenets can be included into doctrine.
107 Although this study brings many important lessons to light, it has limitations. The first shortfall is in its methods. Due to the limited scope, access, and time, the study is not an experimental quantitative research study. Its reliance on already existing data available in unclassified formats meant that the data is not ideal for the study of diffusion of innovations. The data available is too general and does not examine specific USG governance and development programs.
